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[The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation (Terrorism) Amend-
ment Act 2003 (Cth) is the most controversial piece of anti-terrorism legislation passed 
by the Commonwealth Parliament. The Act created a system of warrants that permit the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to question and detain non-suspects for the 
purposes of gathering intelligence about terrorism offences. This regime is subject to a 
sunset clause and will expire in July 2016, unless renewed by Parliament. This article 
provides a comprehensive overview of the process by which warrants are issued and the 
powers conferred by them. It finds that the regime is insufficiently tailored to its purpose 
of protecting Australians against terrorism. In light of this, and evidence about how the 
powers have been used, the article concludes that these extraordinary questioning and 
detention powers should not be renewed without significant amendment.] 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth) (‘ASIO Amendment Act’) conferred extraordinary 
new powers on Australia’s domestic intelligence agency, the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’). It did so by inserting a new pt III 
div 3, ‘Special Powers Relating to Terrorism Offences’, into the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (‘ASIO Act’). The ASIO 
Amendment Act was part of a package of anti-terrorism legislation introduced 
by the then Coalition government after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington, DC. Among other things, the package introduced into 
Australian law a definition of ‘terrorist act’,1 criminalised terrorist acts and a 
broad range of preparatory conduct,2 provided for the proscription of terrorist 
 
 1 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch s 100.1. 
 2 Ibid sch divs 101–3; Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) ss 20–1. 
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organisations,3 established a new regime for dealing with national security 
information in court proceedings4 and vested new powers in intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies to investigate terrorism.5 
The ASIO Amendment Act is one of the most controversial pieces of legis-
lation ever passed by the Commonwealth Parliament.6 It was, and remains, 
unique in the Western democratic world in that it establishes a system 
(‘Special Powers Regime’) whereby an intelligence agency may coercively 
question and detain a non-suspect citizen.7 The controversial nature of the 
Special Powers Regime is demonstrated by the long and tumultuous process 
of its enactment. Few pieces of legislation have been the subject of such a high 
level of scrutiny by the Commonwealth Parliament, parliamentary commit-
tees and the public generally.8 At a total of 15 months from introduction to 
passage,9 the parliamentary debate on the Special Powers Regime was the 
second longest in Australia’s history.10 
As enacted, the Special Powers Regime was temporary in nature. A sunset 
clause was included such that the powers expired after three years.11 However, 
in 2006, the Commonwealth Parliament renewed the powers and added a new 
10-year sunset clause.12 The then Coalition government justified the length of 
the renewed sunset clause on the basis that there was still a threat of terrorist 
attack and it was undesirable to distract ASIO from its operations any more 
 
 3 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch div 102. 
 4 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). 
 5 See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IAA div 3A, pt IC div 2 sub-div B (‘Commonwealth Crimes 
Act’). For a detailed discussion of Australian anti-terrorism legislation enacted since the 9/11 
attacks, see George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melbourne 
University Law Review 1136. 
 6 Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, An 
Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) 1. 
 7 Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest, No 114 of 
2005–06, 5 May 2006. 
 8 Jenny Hocking, Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy 
(University of New South Wales Press, 2004) 218. 
 9 The legislation was introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament in March 2002 and 
passed in June 2003. 
 10 Andrew Lynch and George Williams, What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia’s Anti-
Terror Laws (University of New South Wales Press, 2006) 33. 
 11 ASIO Amendment Act sch 1 item 24, inserting ASIO Act s 34Y. 
 12 ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) sch 2 item 32. 
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frequently than necessary.13 Similarly, the Director-General of ASIO insisted 
that the threat of terrorism ‘is a long-term, generational threat’ and ‘it is 
inevitable that we will have further attacks’.14 The Special Powers Regime will 
now expire on 22 July 2016. No later than six months prior to its expiry, the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (‘PJCIS’) must 
report to the Commonwealth Parliament on the operation, effectiveness and 
implications of the Special Powers Regime.15 This review will be critical. If the 
PJCIS recommends that the Special Powers Regime remain in effect, it is 
likely that the legislation will be made permanent or, at the very least, renewed 
with another lengthy sunset clause attached.  
A considerable amount has been said and written about the Special Powers 
Regime. Nevertheless, there are significant and problematic gaps in the 
literature. During the enactment of the Regime and in the early years of its 
operation, much of what was said and written was highly polemical — either 
brimming with outrage at the significant intrusions the Special Powers 
Regime makes into fundamental human rights or expressing frustration at the 
delays and political compromises required in order to enact measures 
regarded by the executive as necessary to protect Australians against a 
terrorist attack. On the one hand, it was said that the Regime, at least in the 
form in which it was first introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament, 
would not be out of place ‘in former dictatorships such as General Pinochet’s 
Chile’16 or Suharto’s Indonesia.17 On the other hand, those who opposed or 
delayed the Regime were said to be to blame if any Australian blood was spilt 
by terrorism as a result.18 
Even years after the enactment of the Special Powers Regime, most of the 
literature still analyses the Special Powers Regime in a piecemeal fashion. For 
 
 13 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 May 2006, 57 (Philip 
Ruddock). For a detailed discussion of the debates regarding the inclusion of the sunset 
clause in 2003 and its renewal in 2006, see Nicola McGarrity, Rishi Gulati and George Wil-
liams, ‘Sunset Clauses in Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2012) 33 Adelaide Law Review (forth-
coming). 
 14 Evidence to Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, 
Canberra, 19 May 2005, 2 (Dennis Richardson). 
 15 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(bb). 
 16 Referring to the Regime as initially proposed in the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth): George Williams, ‘Why 
the ASIO Bill Is Rotten to the Core’, The Age (online), 27 August 2002 <http://www. 
theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/26/1030053032903.html>. 
 17 Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 
2011) 329. 
 18 Lynch and Williams, above n 10, 33. See also Hocking, above n 8, 220, 223–4. 
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example, some commentators have focused upon the process by which it was 
enacted.19 Others have examined constitutional issues, such as the legislative 
powers underpinning the Regime and the Regime’s implications for the 
separation of powers.20 Still more have examined the adequacy of the ac-
countability mechanisms incorporated into the powers21 and whether the 
framework in place to supervise use of the Special Powers is adequate to 
ensure the integrity of the Regime.22 Finally, commentators have sought to 
explain how Australia came to enact a Regime that differs so significantly 
from the responses of other countries threatened (often to a much greater 
extent) by terrorism.23 
For the most part, the literature has been strongly critical of ASIO’s special 
powers. However, there has also been support for the Regime (and not just 
from the parliamentarians who sponsored it). Most notably, in 2005, the 
 
 19 Dominique Dalla Pozza, ‘Promoting Deliberative Debate? The Submissions and Oral 
Evidence Provided to Australian Parliamentary Committees in the Creation of Counter-
Terrorism Laws’ (2008) 23(1) Australasian Parliamentary Review 39; Greg Carne, ‘Gathered 
Intelligence or Antipodean Exceptionalism? Securing the Development of ASIO’s Detention 
and Questioning Regime’ (2006) 27 Adelaide Law Review 1. 
 20 Greg Carne, ‘Detaining Questions or Compromising Constitutionality? The ASIO Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth)’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 
524; Rebecca Welsh, ‘A Question of Integrity: The Role of Judges in Counter-Terrorism Ques-
tioning and Detention by ASIO’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 138. 
 21 Jude McCulloch and Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Secret State, Transparent Subject: The Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation in the Age of Terror’ (2005) 38 Australian and New Zea-
land Journal of Criminology 400; Sarah Sorial, ‘The Use and Abuse of Power and Why We 
Need a Bill of Rights: The ASIO (Terrorism) Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) and the Case of R v 
Ul-Haque’ (2008) 34 Monash University Law Review 400. 
 22 Lisa Burton and George Williams, ‘The Integrity Function and ASIO’s Extraordinary 
Questioning and Detention Powers’ (2012) 38 Monash University Law Review (forthcoming). 
 23 Some of the explanations put forward include: the lack of a Bill of Rights to constrain the 
legislative process (Nicola McGarrity, ‘An Example of “Worst Practice”? The Coercive Coun-
ter-Terrorism Powers of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’ (2010) 4 Vienna 
Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 467, 474; Carne, ‘Gathered Intelligence’, 
above n 19, 7–8; Nicola McGarrity and George Williams, ‘Counter-Terrorism Laws in a 
Nation without a Bill of Rights: The Australian Experience’ (2010) 2 City University of Hong 
Kong Law Review 45); Australia’s comparative inexperience with terrorism (Hocking, above  
n 8, 232); the instrumentalisation of the terrorist threat for the purposes of ‘political theatre’ 
(Roach, The 9/11 Effect, above n 17, 310–11, 313–14); the strong majority held by the then 
Coalition government, which enabled it to push through such remarkable legislation (at 314); 
complex dynamics of ‘antipodean exceptionalism’ (Carne, ‘Gathered Intelligence’, above n 19) 
and a general paradigmatic shift away from traditional models of criminal justice and polic-
ing towards an intelligence or ‘security’ state (McCulloch and Tham, above n 21; Roach, The 
9/11 Effect, above n 17, 331). 
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Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (‘PJCAAD’)24 found 
that the Regime continued to be justified by the threat of terrorism. The 
Committee also found that the questioning that had so far occurred under the 
Special Powers Regime had been useful in monitoring potential terrorists in 
order to prevent attacks.25 To date, the PJCAAD is the only body to have 
reviewed the Regime.26 
Almost a decade has passed since the enactment of the Special Powers 
Regime. More than 50 other pieces of anti-terrorism legislation have been 
enacted since 9/11, reflecting the fact that Australian governments, from both 
sides of politics, view terrorism as an ongoing threat. There is every likelihood 
that the ‘war on terror’ will never come to a close. For this reason, the Special 
Powers Regime cannot be dismissed as a temporary or extraordinary response 
to the threat of terrorism. Instead, it is time to conduct a fresh evaluation of 
the Regime on the basis that it is (or, at least, may become in the near future) a 
permanent feature of the Australian legal landscape. Our intention in doing 
this is to start the debate — in advance of the PJCIS’ 2016 review — about 
whether the Special Powers Regime should continue in operation as is, be 
amended or even repealed. We consider questions such as whether the Special 
Powers Regime has served an important security function over the past 
decade and whether its impact upon basic human rights has been necessary 
and proportionate. The answers to these questions shed light on whether the 
Special Powers Regime is sustainable over the longer term, and compatible 
with Australia’s democratic values and public law principles. 
This article adopts a holistic, first-principles approach to the Special Pow-
ers Regime. In Part II, we examine how the Special Powers Regime was 
brought about and the justifications provided for its enactment. Parts III and 
IV then examine the process by which a warrant is issued and the nature of 
the powers conferred by a Special Powers Warrant. Part V then sets out how 
the Special Powers Regime has been used to date. In 2005, the PJCAAD noted 
that the Regime had been in existence for ‘only a very short time’ and the 
‘whole range of the powers [had] not yet been exercised’. As a result, the 
 
 24 The PJCAAD is the predecessor of the PJCIS. 
 25 PJCAAD, Parliament of Australia, ASIO’s Questioning and Detention Powers: Review of the 
Operation, Effectiveness and Implications of Division 3 of Part III in the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (2005) 107 [6.41]. 
 26 The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (‘INSLM’) discussed the Special 
Powers Regime in his December 2011 report but did not make any recommendations: Bret 
Walker, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor — Annual Report 16 December 
2011 (2012). The Monitor’s second report is due by 31 December 2012. 
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Committee was reluctant to conclude whether the powers were ‘workable’, 
‘reasonable’, ‘would be used widely’ and ‘whether they are constitutionally 
valid.’27 There is now a much greater body of evidence upon which to judge 
the practical operation of the Special Powers Regime. Finally, in Part VI we set 
out our conclusions about the current state and future of the Special Powers 
Regime. 
II   D E V E L O P M E N T  O F  T H E  SP E C IA L  P O W E R S  RE G I M E  
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) (‘ASIO Bill (No 1)’) was introduced by then 
Commonwealth Attorney-General, Daryl Williams, into the Commonwealth 
Parliament on 21 March 2002. Williams justified the Regime on a number of 
bases. First, he said ASIO required new powers to respond to the threat of 
terrorism. The events of September 11 marked ‘a fundamental shift in the 
international security environment’ and demonstrated that ‘no country is safe 
from … terrorism’.28 The Coalition government needed to take ‘strong and 
decisive steps to ensure that Australia is well placed to respond’.29 Williams 
accepted that ‘there [was] no specific threat to Australia’ at that time.30 
Nevertheless, there had been a general elevation of Australia’s ‘profile as a 
terrorist target’ and an increased threat to its interests abroad.31 After the Bali 
bombings in October 2002, there was a shift in rhetoric; the Special Powers 
Regime was then portrayed ‘as an attempt to protect the Australian people 
“against a known threat”.’32 
Secondly, Williams acknowledged that the proposed coercive questioning 
and detention powers were ‘extraordinary’. However, he argued these powers 
were necessary and appropriate because terrorism was an extraordinary 
 
 27 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 107 [6.44]. 
 28 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1930. 
 29 Ibid. 
 30 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 23 September 2002, 7040. 
 31 Ibid. The absence of a specific threat to Australia was the basis of strident criticisms of the 
proposed Regime. For example, Tanya Plibersek said: 
I think that we all agree with the Attorney-General when he says that he cannot find evi-
dence of a current threat of terrorism in Australia. Indeed, the head of ASIO says that 
there is no current threat to Australia. Why then are we even considering introducing 
such draconian legislation … ? 
  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 September 2002, 6817. 
 32 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 100 [6.12], quoting Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 June 2003, 17 678 (Kim Beazley). 
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‘evil’.33 Terrorism was ‘quite unlike ordinary crime, necessitating a response 
quite unlike the accepted responses to criminal activity’.34 The potentially 
catastrophic consequences of terrorist attacks required both intelligence-
gathering and law enforcement agencies to detect and stop such attacks before 
they occurred. The creation of strong investigative powers was necessary to 
achieve this purpose.35 Williams also said these powers would enable prosecu-
tions of the newly-created preparatory terrorism offences: ‘In order to ensure 
that any perpetrators of these serious offences are discovered and prosecuted, 
preferably before they perpetrate their crimes, it is necessary to enhance the 
powers of ASIO to investigate terrorism offences.’36 Without coercive ques-
tioning powers, Williams argued, ‘a terrorist sympathiser who may know of a 
planned bombing of a busy building … may decline to help authorities thwart 
the attack.’37 Without the power to detain, terrorists may be ‘warned before 
they are caught [and] planned acts of terrorism known to ASIO … resched-
uled rather than prevented’.38 This argument was repeated throughout the 
protracted parliamentary debate, for example in December 2002:  
The key aim of this important legislation is to enable ASIO to question people 
in emergency terrorist situations in order to obtain the information we need to 
stop terrorist attacks before people are hurt or killed.39 
 
 33 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1932. 
 34 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 99 [6.10]. 
 35 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1930. 
 36 Ibid. The logic of statements such as this is questionable. Can a person be a perpetrator of a 
criminal act without actually committing that act? This raises the spectre of ‘pre-crime’ and 
‘pre-punishment’: see also Lucia Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology?’ (2007) 11 
Theoretical Criminology 261; Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering, ‘Pre-Crime and Counter-
Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the “War on Terror”’ (2009) 49 British Journal of 
Criminology 628. 
 37 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1931. 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 December 2002,  
10 429 (Daryl Williams). This preventive rationale has been criticised. The ability of the state 
to prevent terrorism (and other crime) has been doubted. It is also questionable whether the 
possibility of preventing unknown harms justifies the expansion of executive power or the 
restriction of individual rights. See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of 
Balance’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 191; Lucia Zedner, ‘Terrorism, the Ticking 
Bomb, and Criminal Justice Values’ (2008) 73 Criminal Justice Matters 18; Jude McCulloch 
and Sharon Pickering, ‘Counter-Terrorism: The Law and Policing of Pre-Emption’ in Nicola 
McGarrity, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Counter-Terrorism and Beyond: The 
Culture of Law and Justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010) 13. 
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Finally, the Coalition government argued that the strength of its response 
was tempered by adequate safeguards. It ‘recognise[d] the need to maintain 
the balance between the security of the community and individual rights and 
to avoid the potential for abuse.’ The powers were intended to be ‘a measure of 
last resort’ and were ‘subject to a number of strict safeguards’.40 
Over the next 15 months, the Special Powers Regime was debated and 
scrutinised. This process was a welcome exception to the general trend of 
‘hyperactive’ legislating that otherwise characterised Australia in the years 
immediately after 9/11.41 Anti-terrorism legislation had been passed hurried-
ly, often after limited debate, with insufficient consideration of the necessity of 
the measures or their impact on fundamental human rights.42 However, the 
enactment of the Special Powers Regime was not perfect. Hocking suggests 
that the parliamentary debate was both confused and polemical, especially 
after the Bali bombings in October 2002.43 Further, it was largely limited to 
‘fussing around the edges’, leaving the essence of the regime — the power to 
coercively question and detain non-suspects — untouched.44 The parliamen-
tary process did, however, result in significant improvements to the legisla-
tion. These are evident when the initial proposal in the ASIO Bill (No 1) is 
compared with the Special Powers Regime as ultimately enacted. Many of the 
most concerning aspects of the ASIO Bill (No 1) were blunted and a better 
balance struck between the protection of civil liberties and national security.  
The initial proposal contained in the ASIO Bill (No 1) would have permit-
ted ASIO to question or detain any person, including a child over the age of 
14, if there were ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ that this would ‘substan-
tially assist the collection of intelligence that [was] important in relation to a 
terrorism offence’.45A person subject to a warrant could be detained incom-
 
 40 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1930 
(Daryl Williams). See also at 1931. 
 41 Roach, The 9/11 Effect, above n 17, 325. 
 42 See Andrew Lynch, ‘Legislating with Urgency: The Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act  
[No 1] 2005’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 747; McGarrity and Williams, above  
n 23. 
 43 ‘Such was the confusion over which amendments now stood and just whose Bill this was — 
the government’s or the Opposition’s — that at one point the Senate passed the wrong 
amendments’: Hocking, above n 8, 228. See also Lynch and Williams, above n 10, 33. Senator 
Bob Brown described the Prime Minister’s claim that parliamentarians who delayed the 
passage of the legislation would be to blame for Australian lives lost in the meantime as  
‘a new low in [political] debate’: Hocking, above n 8, 223–4. 
 44 Hocking, above n 8, 220. This was in large part because the major opposition party (the 
Australian Labor Party) accepted the need for the legislation from an early stage. 
 45 ASIO Bill (No 1) s 24. 
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municado. They could be prevented from contacting their family, employer 
and even their lawyer. Each warrant only permitted detention for a maximum 
of 48 hours. However, there was no restriction on the number of warrants that 
could be obtained and no additional criteria for a second (or third) warrant. 
Although rationalised by the government as an extraordinary response to an 
emergency situation,46 the legislation was not subject to any sunset clause or 
mandatory review process.  
The ASIO Bill (No 1) was referred to the PJCAAD for review. The 
PJCAAD was highly critical, stating that the Bill ‘would undermine key legal 
rights and erode the civil liberties that make Australia a leading democracy.’47 
Of the 15 recommendations made by the PJCAAD, the Coalition government 
adopted 10. Non-government Senators and the Coalition government 
remained deadlocked on five points: the ability to detain non-suspects; the 
ability to obtain warrants in respect of children aged 14 to 18; significant 
restrictions on the ability of a person subject to a warrant to communicate 
with the outside world (and in particular, restrictions on access to legal 
representation and advice); and the absence of a sunset clause.48 The Attor-
ney-General argued that the amendments sought by non-government 
Senators would render the powers ‘useless in the emergency situations it [was] 
designed to address’.49 It was necessary to question and detain children 
because, in other countries, children had been used to commit terrorism 
offences.50 Similarly, delaying access to a lawyer might be vital in ‘extreme 
circumstances’ in which ‘there may be imminent danger to the community’.51 
The Bill was then referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee (‘SLCRC’) for further consideration.52 The SLCRC tabled its 
 
 46 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1930 
(Daryl Williams); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 
December 2002, 10 427–8 (Daryl Williams). Note the Attorney-General refrained from 
labelling this a ‘temporary’ threat, saying ‘[w]e simply cannot say that these laws will no 
longer be required in two, three or four years’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 12 December 2002, 10 428. 
 47 PJCAAD, Advisory Report, above n 6, vii. 
 48 Hocking, above n 8, 219. 
 49 It was also said that the involvement of sitting judges would be unconstitutional, despite some 
advice to the contrary: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 
December 2002, 10 427. 
 50 Ibid 10 429. 
 51 Ibid. 
 52 SLCRC, Parliament of Australia, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and Related Matters (2002). 
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report in December 2002, making a further 27 recommendations. It chal-
lenged the very heart of the Special Powers Regime, asking whether question-
ing or detention of non-suspects was necessary.53  
By the end of the 2002 parliamentary year, the deadlock had not been 
resolved and the Bill was laid aside. The proposal was revised and reintro-
duced as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (No 2) (Cth) (‘ASIO Bill (No 2)’) on 20 
March 2003. This Bill was substantially the same as its predecessor. However, 
after further negotiations between the government, opposition and non-
government Senators, the Bill finally passed on 26 June 2003. The core of the 
ASIO Amendment Act was the same — ASIO could coercively question and 
detain non-suspect citizens. However, the three key points of contention 
identified above had been addressed: warrants could not be issued against 
persons under 16; detainees had (as a general rule) access to a lawyer of their 
choice; and the Regime was subject to a three-year sunset clause.  
The Special Powers Regime has since been amended seven times. The 
majority of these amendments were technical in nature.54 Only two batches of 
amendments were of real significance. The first — the ASIO Legislation 
Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) — was made just five months after the Special 
Powers Regime was enacted.55 These amendments were said to be necessary to 
overcome ‘practical limitations’56 and ‘technical flaws’57 since identified in the 
Special Powers Regime. Although the then Coalition government was 
criticised for so swiftly altering the legislation,58 the amendments were passed 
with relatively little parliamentary debate and ‘virtually no publicity’.59 The 
2003 amendments increased the time limit for the questioning of non-
 
 53 Ibid recommendations 5–8. The SLCRC ‘proposed that a coercive questioning regime closer 
to those already in place for Royal Commissions should be considered: one aimed only at 
suspects rather than at general intelligence collection purposes’: Hocking, above n 8, 220. 
 54 For an overview of the amendments made up until 2005, see Lynch and Williams, above n 10, 
33. Also, the Law Enforcement (AFP Professional Standards and Related Measures) Act 2006 
(Cth) sch 3A made amendments to complement the creation of the new Law Enforcement 
Integrity Commissioner, and to enable persons subject to a warrant to make complaints to 
that Commissioner. 
 55 This Act received royal assent on 17 December 2003. 
 56 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2003, 23 481 
(Philip Ruddock). 
 57 Ibid 23 463 (Robert McClelland). 
 58 See, eg, ibid 23 470 (Michael Organ). 
 59 See, eg, McCulloch and Tham, above n 21, 403. 
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suspects requiring an interpreter from 24 hours to 48 hours. They also made it 
an offence to disclose information related to a warrant.60  
The second batch of amendments was made in response to the 2005 
PJCAAD report.61 The ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) intro-
duced: an explicit right to access a lawyer; provisions to facilitate the rights of 
review and complaint given to a person subject to a warrant; and clarification 
of the role of a person’s lawyer in the questioning process. Most significantly, 
the 2006 amendments renewed the Special Powers Regime for a further 10 
years (until July 2016).62 
III   P R O C E S S  O F  I S S U I N G  A  WA R R A N T 
The ASIO Amendment Act created two categories of warrant: Questioning 
Warrants63 and Questioning and Detention Warrants (‘Detention War-
rants’).64 This Part discusses the process by which warrants are issued and the 
criteria that must be satisfied for each type of warrant. Part IV discusses the 
powers that Questioning Warrants and Detention Warrants confer upon 
ASIO. 
Applications for Questioning or Detention Warrants are made by the Di-
rector-General of ASIO (‘Director-General’). Before an application may be 
made, the Director-General must obtain the consent of the Attorney-General. 
He or she must give the Attorney-General a draft of the application, which 
includes ‘a statement of the facts and other grounds on which the Director-
General considers it necessary that the warrant should be issued’.65 The ASIO 
Act sets out a list of criteria of which the Attorney-General must be satisfied. 
If the Attorney-General is satisfied of these criteria, he or she may give the 
Director-General written consent to make an application to an Issuing 
Authority.66  
 
 60 ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) sch 1 items 1, 7. 
 61 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, xiv–xvii. 
 62 There was extensive parliamentary debate about the renewal of the legislation and the length 
of the new sunset clause. For a discussion of these debates, see McGarrity, Gulati and Wil-
liams, above n 13. 
 63 ASIO Act pt III div 3 sub-div B. 
 64 Ibid pt III div 3 sub-div C. 
 65 Ibid s 34D(3)(b). 
 66 Ibid s 34D(4). The Attorney-General also has the discretion to make changes to the draft 
application before it is made. 
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An Issuing Authority is a current Federal Magistrate,67 or a judge of a fed-
eral, state or territory court, who has consented to be appointed by the 
Attorney-General.68 The Attorney-General may also ‘declare that persons in a 
specified class are issuing authorities’.69 This allows the Attorney-General to 
appoint anyone as an Issuing Authority, regardless of their position, expertise 
or degree of independence. It could be used, for example, to appoint an ASIO 
officer or another member of the executive.70 The Issuing Authority has an 
important role to play in the Special Powers Regime. He or she is the ultimate 
decision-maker and, like the Attorney-General, must be satisfied of a list of 
criteria before a Questioning or Detention Warrant may be issued.71 There-
fore, it is critical that the Issuing Authority have (and be perceived to have) a 
high level of independence from the executive branch of government. The 
ability to ‘declare that persons in a specified class are issuing authorities’ 
hinders this. 
A  Basic Criteria for Warrants 
Some basic criteria apply to all applications, for either a Questioning or a 
Detention Warrant. Before consenting to an application, the Attorney-General 
must be satisfied that: 
a) the warrant permits the subject to have access to legal representation;72 
b) ‘there are reasonable grounds for believing that issuing the warrant … will 
substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in rela-
tion to a terrorism offence’;73 
c) ‘relying on other methods of collecting that intelligence would be ineffec-
tive’;74 and 
 
 67 In November 2012, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Legislation Amendment Act 2012 
(Cth) renamed the Federal Magistrates Court the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, and 
Federal Magistrates ‘judges’. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Consequential Amend-
ments) Bill 2012 (Cth) — currently before the House of Representatives — will amend the 
ASIO Act to accommodate these changes. 
 68 Ibid s 34AB(1). 
 69 Ibid s 34AB(3). Given the small number of warrants requested to date, the Attorney-General 
has not felt it necessary to create any new categories. 
 70 Hocking, above n 8, 228. 
 71 ASIO Act ss 34E(1), 34G(1). 
 72 Ibid s 34D(5). 
 73 Ibid s 34D(4)(a). 
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d) a protocol is in place to guide the execution of the warrant (which there 
is).75 
Despite it being the ultimate decision-making body, the criteria of which 
the Issuing Authority must be satisfied are substantially narrower. The Issuing 
Authority need only be satisfied of two criteria. First, the Issuing Authority 
must be satisfied that the application is in the proper form and the Attorney-
General’s consent was properly obtained.76 It has been suggested that this 
criterion requires the Issuing Authority to indirectly scrutinise criteria (a)–(d) 
above.77 This is not, however, an accurate description of the Issuing Authori-
ty’s role. For example, the Issuing Authority need only be satisfied that there 
was evidence available to the Attorney-General on which it was open to him 
or her to consent to an application for a warrant. The Issuing Authority is not 
required — or allowed — to re-examine the Attorney-General’s decision that 
there were or were not other methods of intelligence-gathering available.78 
Therefore, this criterion is procedural in nature. 
The second criterion is substantive and replicates criterion (b) above. The 
Issuing Authority must be satisfied that ‘there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the warrant will substantially assist the collection of intelligence 
that is important in relation to a terrorism offence.’79 This criterion sets a very 
low threshold for the issuing of a warrant. This is so for five reasons. First, 
‘intelligence’ is not defined in, or otherwise limited by, the legislation. 
Secondly, the collection of intelligence must only be ‘important’ (not ‘neces-
sary’). Thirdly, the person subject to the warrant need not actually possess any 
intelligence. Rather, it need only be believed that issuing the warrant will 
substantially assist the collection of intelligence: for example, the person may 
be able to point ASIO in the direction of someone who might possess such 
intelligence. Fourthly, ‘in relation to’ goes significantly beyond what might be 
regarded as the main aims of the Special Powers Regime, being to either 
prevent terrorist acts or enable the prosecution of terrorism offences. This 
 
 74 Ibid s 34D(4)(b). 
 75 Ibid s 34D(4)(c). A protocol was first established in 2003. This was amended in 2006 to reflect 
the changes made by the ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth): see Attorney-General’s 
Department (Cth), Explanatory Statement — Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Act 1979: Statement of Procedures — Warrants Issued under Division 3 of Part III (2006). 
 76 ASIO Act ss 34E(5)(a), 34G(8)(a). 
 77 Attorney-General’s Department, Submission No 102 to PJCAAD, Review of Division 3 of Part 
III of the ASIO Act 1979 — Questioning and Detention Powers, 22 June 2005, 20. 
 78 See also PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 36–7 [2.33]. 
 79 ASIO Act ss 34E(1)(b), 34G(1)(b). 
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aspect of the criterion is not adequately tailored to the terrorist threat to 
Australia. Finally, the criterion adopts a generalised approach. It does not 
distinguish between: past, present or future offences; offences that are likely or 
unlikely to occur; and serious or relatively minor offences. The combination 
of these five matters means that a person may be subjected to coercive 
questioning without any suspicion of wrongdoing on his or her part. That 
person may be a friend or family member of someone suspected by ASIO to 
have some sort of current or past connection with terrorism, or even an 
academic, journalist or innocent bystander. Hence, it has been said that ‘if you 
overhear a conversation on a bus which could assist ASIO in its investiga-
tions,’ you could find yourself the subject of a warrant.80 
The Special Powers Regime was intended to be used only as a matter of 
‘last resort’.81 However, the only place where this is reflected in the Regime is 
in criterion (c). This criterion requires the Attorney-General to consider 
whether other, less intrusive methods of intelligence-gathering would be 
effective. If so, the Attorney-General must not consent to an application for a 
warrant. However, it is only the Attorney-General (and not the Issuing 
Authority) who must be satisfied of this criterion. The Commonwealth 
Attorney-General’s Department advised the PJCAAD that this was deliberate 
and justified it on the basis that the Attorney-General ‘is in the better position 
to know whether alternative means of intelligence gathering would be 
ineffective’.82 Judges may be ill-equipped to make determinations on opera-
tional intelligence-gathering issues. However, it is difficult to see why the 
Attorney-General would be any better placed, unless he or she was to take the 
(inappropriate) step of seeking ASIO’s advice on the matter.  
The asymmetry between the criteria of which the Attorney-General and 
the Issuing Authority must be satisfied gives the troubling impression that the 
Issuing Authority merely ‘double-checks’ some aspects of the Attorney-
General’s decision. The involvement of the Issuing Authority has therefore 
been criticised as an attempt to give a ‘veneer’ of judicial approval to a process 
which is in fact controlled by the executive.83 In our opinion, the use of 
extraordinary coercive questioning powers can only be justified if there is 
 
 80 University of Technology, Sydney Community Law Centre, ‘Information Sheet 3: Questioning 
and Detention Powers’ in Be Informed: ASIO and Anti-Terrorism Laws (Information Kit, 
February 2005) 1. 
 81 See above n 40 and accompanying text. 
 82 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 36 [2.31], citing Attorney-General’s 
Department, Submission No 102, above n 77, 20. 
 83 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 35–6 [2.29]. 
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evidence that other methods of intelligence-gathering would not be effec-
tive.84 This is an important matter that should not be left to executive deter-
mination. The ultimate decision-maker should be the Issuing Authority.  
B  Additional Criterion for Detention Warrants 
If ASIO seeks a Detention Warrant, it must satisfy the Attorney-General of the 
basic criteria set out above and an additional detention criterion; that is, that: 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that, if the person is not immediately 
taken into custody and detained, the person: 
 (i) may alert a person involved in a terrorism offence that the offence is be-
ing investigated; or  
 (ii) may not appear before the prescribed authority [at the time required for 
questioning]; or  
 (iii) may destroy, damage or alter a record or thing the person may be re-
quested in accordance with the warrant to produce.85  
Once again, the immediate problem is that only the Attorney-General (and 
not the Issuing Authority) need be satisfied of the additional detention 
criterion. The criteria of which the Issuing Authority must be satisfied are the 
same as for a Questioning Warrant.86 This is an inadequate level of rigour for a 
decision that will deprive an individual of their liberty.87 
Executive detention is the exception — rather than the rule — in Australia. 
It should only be permitted where there is a clear justification for circumvent-
ing the judicial process. In enacting the Special Powers Regime, the then 
Coalition government stated that ASIO needed a power of detention or else 
potential terrorists might be ‘warned before they are caught [and] planned 
acts of terrorism known to ASIO … rescheduled rather than prevented’.88 The 
authors accept that executive detention might be justified if it is necessary to 
protect Australia from a terrorist attack. The problem is that this justification 
is not reflected anywhere in the additional detention criterion.  
 
 84 Note the INSLM appeared to support the contrary conclusion. He questioned whether this 
criteria imposed ‘too high a test for the effective gathering of information under these war-
rants’, but noted there was ‘insufficient practical experience’ to answer: Walker, above n 26, 30. 
 85 ASIO Act s 34F(4)(d). 
 86 Ibid s 34G(1). 
 87 Walker, above n 26, 35. 
 88 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 March 2002, 1931 
(Daryl Williams). 
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Like the basic criteria, the additional detention criterion is expressed in 
vague and broad terms. It hinges on the lax concepts of ‘reasonable belief ’ and 
predictions that certain conduct ‘may’ occur. A much higher level of proof 
than this should be required before a person is detained without a finding of 
criminal guilt. Suspicion that a person ‘may’ not appear for questioning at the 
required time does not warrant detention for up to seven days. By contrast, 
witnesses who have been summonsed to give evidence by a court or other 
tribunal may be arrested and detained, but only once they actually fail to 
appear and only in order to bring them before the court.89 Further, a person 
who has been charged with a crime may be detained pending trial, but that 
power is limited to persons already charged with a crime, subject to strict 
criteria, and exercised by a court after a full hearing.90 Each of these two 
powers is tailored to serve a pressing public purpose: punishing ‘contempt of 
court’ and ensuring those charged with a crime are brought to justice.91 
Similar powers should not be given to an intelligence agency unless they are 
similarly tailored to serve a pressing public purpose. 
Special powers warrants may be obtained if it is believed a warrant will 
substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is ‘important in relation 
to a terrorism offence’.92 This is a much broader category than information 
that is capable of preventing a terrorism offence or of enabling a past terror-
ism offence to be prosecuted. The additional criterion does not seem to raise 
the threshold adequately to justify detention. As the Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor (‘INSLM’) has commented: 
The second possibility (risk of non-appearance) may well literally be true of 
everyone, in the sense that the failure to answer subpoenas or summonses in 
ordinary court proceedings is an everyday occurrence. … The first and third 
possibilities (risk of tip-off or tampering with evidence) may not provide a very 
high bar to be cleared before the extraordinary power of detention is exerted.93 
The belief that the person may alert another person involved in a terrorism 
offence that the offence is being investigated ((a) above) is the most compel-
ling justification for detention. The suggestion is that this will thwart ASIO’s 
 
 89 See, eg, Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 41.05. See also Walker, above n 26, 27. 
 90 See, eg, Commonwealth Crimes Act ss 15–15AB. 
 91 See, eg, Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 24.23; R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex 
parte Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section (1951) 82 CLR 208, 241–3  
(Latham CJ). 
 92 ASIO Act ss 34E(1)(b), 34G(1)(b). 
 93 Walker, above n 26, 34. 
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attempts to prevent a terrorist attack.94 However, the criterion stops short. 
ASIO is not required to show that the tip-off could jeopardise ASIO opera-
tions, or that issuing the warrant would otherwise substantially assist in 
preventing a terrorist act. There is a strong argument that the secrecy provi-
sions in the Special Powers Regime are sufficient to prevent a person subject 
to a warrant revealing sensitive information.95 Alternatively, it may be more 
appropriate to deal with persons who tip off terrorists (or destroy evidence) 
through the ordinary procedures of criminal justice, given this very likely 
constitutes a crime.  
It should be noted that similar (but not identical) criteria are used in other 
anti-terrorism laws. Division 105 of the schedule to the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code’) allows a preventative detention order to be made 
if it is necessary to preserve evidence of or relating to a terrorist act. However, 
it must also be shown ‘a terrorist act has occurred within the last 28 days’ and 
detaining the person is ‘reasonably necessary’ ‘to preserve evidence of, or 
relating to, [that] terrorist act’.96 Division 104 of the Criminal Code allows a 
control order to be made — which may significantly curtail, but not entirely 
abrogate, an individual’s liberty. A court must be satisfied, on the balance of 
probabilities, ‘that making the order would substantially assist in preventing a 
terrorist act’ or ‘that the person has provided training to, or received training 
from, a listed terrorist organisation’.97 Further, any restriction imposed upon 
the subject of the order must be ‘reasonably necessary, and reasonably 
appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a 
terrorist act.’98 These criteria are more closely tailored to serve a pressing 
public purpose than those that apply to Detention Warrants.  
C  Additional Criteria for Repeat Warrants 
As will be discussed in Part IVA2 below, questioning and detention are both 
subject to clear time limits — 24 hours for questioning and seven days for 
detention. The efficacy of these time limits is, however, diminished by the 
power to obtain multiple, successive warrants (‘repeat warrants’). In its 
original form, the Special Powers Regime permitted ASIO to obtain unlim-
 
 94 Ibid. 
 95 Ibid 35. 
 96 Criminal Code s 105.4(6). 
 97 Ibid s 104.4(1). 
 98 Ibid s 104.4(1)(d). 
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ited, successive warrants without satisfying any additional criteria.99 The 
current form of the Special Powers Regime represents a compromise between 
the political parties. Repeat warrants continue to be permitted. Additional 
criteria must, however, be satisfied (‘repeat warrant criteria’). 
The Director-General must, when seeking the consent of the Attorney-
General, provide him or her with details of any requests previously made in 
respect of the same person. If a warrant was actually issued, the Director-
General must also provide details of that warrant, including the length of time 
for which the person was previously questioned and/or detained.100 This is the 
only limitation on ASIO’s ability to obtain a repeat Questioning Warrant.  
Three other criteria must be satisfied if ASIO is seeking a repeat Detention 
Warrant (‘repeat detention criteria’). First, in deciding whether to consent to 
or issue a repeat Detention Warrant, the Attorney-General and the Issuing 
Authority must ‘take account of those facts’; apparently meaning the fact that 
a warrant has been issued and that the person ‘has [previously] been de-
tained’.101 It is arguable that, far from being a substantive consideration, this 
simply requires acknowledgement of the fact of prior questioning or deten-
tion. Secondly, the Attorney-General and Issuing Authority must be satisfied 
that the warrant ‘is justified by information additional to or materially 
different from that known to the Director-General at the time the Director-
General sought the Minister’s consent to request the issue of the last of the 
earlier warrants’.102 This criterion may be relatively easy to satisfy, as ASIO will 
have had ample opportunity to question the person and extract new infor-
mation before applying for a repeat warrant.103 ASIO may also be able to argue 
that the particular information upon which it now relies was not ‘known’ at 
the time the earlier warrant was sought (an assertion that would be difficult to 
challenge). Finally, the person must be released from detention before the 
repeat Detention Warrant is issued (but not before ASIO requests the Attor-
ney-General’s consent).104 This ensures that a person is not held in continuous 
detention for longer than the maximum seven days. It would, however, permit 
ASIO to release a person from custody and detain him or her just a few 
 
 99 This aspect of the Bill was criticised. See PJCAAD, Advisory Report, above n 6, 22–3, 32; 
Hocking, above n 8, 227. 
 100 ASIO Act ss 34D(3)(c)–(d), 34F(3)(c)–(d). 
 101 Ibid ss 34F(6)(a), 34G(2)(a). 
 102 Ibid ss 34F(6)(b)(i), 34G(2)(b)(i). 
 103 Carne, ‘Detaining Questions’, above n 20, 568–9. 
 104 ASIO Act s 34G(2)(b). 
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moments later. This requirement is little more than a procedural inconven-
ience for ASIO.105  
The repeat warrant criteria do not substantially limit ASIO’s ability to ob-
tain multiple warrants and question or detain a person for longer than the 
prima facie time limits. There is also no limit on the number of repeat 
warrants that may be issued. Therefore, the Special Powers Regime retains the 
same flaw as that initially proposed in the ASIO Bill (No 1): a person may be 
questioned or detained for an indefinite period of time under successive 
warrants (including in circumstances where there is little reason for detention 
in the first place).106  
If a repeat warrant is sought, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security (‘IGIS’), an independent office-holder, must be given a copy of the 
draft request. The IGIS must consider whether the particular request satisfies 
the repeat warrant criteria and set out this decision in its Annual Report.107 
This procedure ensures that there is a further level of oversight of repeat 
warrants. However, the IGIS is something of a toothless tiger in this regard. It 
does not have the power to veto a repeat warrant if it believes that the criteria 
are not satisfied. Even if it did have this power, it is unlikely that the IGIS 
would make a decision until well after the repeat warrant had been executed.  
D  Additional Criterion for Warrants against Minors 
In its original form, the Special Powers Regime permitted ASIO to obtain 
Questioning or Detention Warrants against children as young as 14. Called an 
‘appalling proposal’108 by its critics, this was regarded as one of most indefen-
sible aspects of the Regime.109 The then Coalition government defended its 
Bill, insisting that international intelligence demonstrated that children could 
perpetrate and had perpetrated terrorist attacks110 and ‘[t]he Australian public 
would be appalled to think that we failed to prevent a 17-year-old terrorist 
 
 105 The government rejected calls for a seven-day ‘immunity period’ between successive 
warrants, as creating unnecessary ‘red tape’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 
25 June 2003, 12 588–9 (Chris Ellison). 
 106 For further criticism of the continued availability of repeat warrants, see Hocking, above n 8, 
228, 230. 
 107 ASIO Act s 34ZJ. 
 108 Hocking, above n 8, 216. 
 109 Roach, The 9/11 Effect, above n 17, 330. 
 110 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 December 2002,  
10 429 (Daryl Williams); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 
23 June 2003, 12 135, 12 184 (Chris Ellison). 
2012] The Extraordinary Questioning and Detention Powers of ASIO 435 
bomber because ASIO was not allowed to ask him or her questions.’111 After 
protracted disagreement, the power to issue a warrant in respect of persons 
under the age of 16 was removed.112 Further, while warrants may be obtained 
against persons aged between 16 and 18, an additional criterion must be 
satisfied (‘additional minors criterion’). To date, it does not appear that any 
warrants have been issued in respect of young people.113  
The question of whether coercive questioning and detention powers 
should be used against minors is an emotive one. It is unlikely this power will 
ever be comfortably accepted — even if it is subject to appropriately stringent 
criteria. In the authors’ opinion, the Special Powers Regime is only justifiable 
if it is necessary to protect Australia from a terrorist threat or to prosecute a 
terrorism offence. The additional minors criterion reflects this. The Attorney-
General may only consent to a warrant against a person aged 16 to 18 if the 
Attorney-General ‘is satisfied on reasonable grounds that … it is likely the 
person will commit, is committing or has committed a terrorism offence’,114 
and that the warrant confers upon the young person the additional rights 
stipulated in the legislation.115 This is a clear step in the right direction.116 A 
similar provision should be included for all warrants.  
Nevertheless, the additional minors criterion is insufficient to comply with 
Australia’s international obligations, in particular, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (‘CRC’).117 The CRC requires that the best interests of the 
child be given primary consideration in executive decision-making.118 The 
imprisonment of a child should also be used only as a measure of last resort 
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.119 It would be appropriate to 
 
 111 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 December 2002,  
10 429 (Daryl Williams). 
 112 ASIO Act ss 34ZE(1)–(2). 
 113 In December 2011, the INSLM stated ‘experience has not extended to any of the exceptional 
cases of special rules for people aged between 16 and 18 years’: Walker, above n 26, 29. No 
warrants have been issued since. 
 114 ASIO Act s 34ZE(4)(a). 
 115 Ibid s 34ZE(4)(b). 
 116 Walker, above n 26, 29. 
 117 Opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 
1990). See also McGarrity, ‘Worst Practice’, above n 23, 473; Christopher Michaelsen, ‘Antiter-
rorism Legislation in Australia: A Proportionate Response to the Terrorist Threat?’ (2005) 28 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 321, 327–8. 
 118 CRC art 3. 
 119 Ibid art 37(b). 
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make these matters prerequisites for the issuing of a Questioning or Detention 
Warrant in respect of a minor. 
A further problem is that, once again, the additional minors criterion is 
determined by the Attorney-General alone. The decision to coercively 
question or detain a minor should be subject to the highest degree of scrutiny. 
Judicial consideration would be particularly appropriate in light of the nature 
of the additional minors criterion. This criterion poses the question of 
whether a minor will commit, is committing or has committed a terrorism 
offence. Such a question is eminently suitable for determination by a judicial 
officer (even if acting in his or her personal capacity), and arguably unsuitable 
for determination by a government minister. Therefore, at the very least, the 
additional minors criterion should be scrutinised and determined by the 
Issuing Authority.  
IV  N AT U R E  O F  T H E  P O W E R S 
There is considerable overlap in the powers conferred by, and operation of, 
Questioning and Detention Warrants.120 The following sections will explain 
key aspects of the powers. Parts IVA and IVB examine the questioning 
process and the conditions of detention. Part IVC then looks at the availability 
of legal representation and advice to a person subject to either a Questioning 
or Detention Warrant. Finally, Part IVD assesses the extent to which commu-
nications per se and the content of those communications are restricted by the 
Special Powers Regime.  
A  Questioning 
A Questioning Warrant empowers ASIO to ‘request’ a person to ‘give infor-
mation’ or ‘produce records or things that are or may be relevant to intelli-
gence that is important in relation to a terrorism offence’.121 ASIO may make 
copies and/or transcripts of any material so produced.122 It is important to 
understand that detention under a Detention Warrant is not an end in  
itself — in contrast with other anti-terrorism measures that limit a person’s 
liberty, such as Control Orders under div 104 and Preventative Detention 
Orders under div 105 of the Criminal Code. The main purpose of a Detention 
 
 120 This overlap has been criticised for creating confusion about the rights and obligations of 
persons subject to a warrant: PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 38. 
 121 ASIO Act ss 34E(4)(a), 34G(7)(a). See also at s 34ZD. 
 122 Ibid s 34E(4)(b). 
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Warrant is to detain a person so that they may be effectively questioned in 
order to obtain intelligence that is important in relation to a terrorism 
offence.123 Therefore, the following discussion about the questioning process 
applies equally to Questioning and Detention Warrants.  
1 Questioning Process 
A Questioning Warrant stipulates a time in the future that the person subject 
of the warrant must appear before a Prescribed Authority. In contrast, a 
person subject to a Detention Warrant must be brought before a Prescribed 
Authority for questioning ‘immediately’ after he or she is detained.124 The first 
task of the Prescribed Authority is to explain a number of matters and to 
‘satisfy him or herself that the subject has understood the explanations 
given.’125 These matters include: the terms of the warrant; the person’s rights 
and obligations;126 the questioning process;127 and ‘the use which may be 
made of any information or materials provided by the subject, including any 
derivative use for the purpose of criminal investigations.’128 Most obviously 
missing from this list of matters is an explanation of the reasons why the 
warrant was issued.  
In addition, the Prescribed Authority must explain to the subject of the 
warrant ‘the function or role of all persons present during questioning’.129 The 
questioning process occurs in a ‘closed room’; that is, the public does not have 
access to the questioning. There will, however, be more than 10 people present 
during the questioning.130 Obviously, one will be the person being questioned. 
It is likely that his or her lawyer will also be present unless, as discussed in 
Part IVC below, the lawyer is excluded by the Prescribed Authority. If the 
person is between 16 and 18 years, he or she is also entitled to have a parent, 
 
 123 See the discussion of the additional detention criterion, above Part IIIB. 
 124 ASIO Act s 34H. 
 125 Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979: 
Statement of Procedures — Warrants Issued under Division 3 of Part III (2006) cl 7.3 (‘Proto-
col’). 
 126 If the person is aged between 16 and 18, this will include explanation of the ‘special rules’ that 
apply to ‘young people’: ASIO Act s 34ZE(8). 
 127 Ibid s 34J. 
 128 Attorney-General’s Department, Protocol, above n 125, cl 7.3. 
 129 Ibid. 
 130 PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 13 [1.4.2]. No more recent evidence 
is available. 
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guardian or other suitable representative in the room.131 The next group of 
persons allowed to be present are the questioners. The Prescribed Authority 
does not conduct the questioning. This is done by an ASIO officer or, alterna-
tively, by a solicitor from the Australian Government Solicitor’s office repre-
senting ASIO.132 This solicitor is also there to provide advice to the ASIO 
officer. The Protocol requires a police officer to be present at all times during 
the questioning.133  
The final group of persons present are those supervising the questioning 
process. The IGIS is permitted to be present, but does not have to be. In 
practice, the IGIS has chosen to be present at the overwhelming majority of 
questioning.134 To protect against abuses of process, the legislation requires 
that the questioning must be video- and audio-recorded.135 Video technicians 
will therefore be in the room for this purpose.  
The most important supervisory function is performed by the Prescribed 
Authority. He or she has the ultimate responsibility for the questioning 
process and, to this end, may make binding directions regarding this process. 
The Prescribed Authority may, for example, direct that there be a break in 
questioning or that questioning be deferred until a later date.136 Failure to 
comply with these directions is a criminal offence.137 Directions may be 
requested by either the person subject to the warrant138 or ASIO.139 They may 
 
 131 ASIO Act ss 34ZE(6)(b), (8). 
 132 Ibid ss 34E(4)(a), 34G(7)(a); PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25,  
13 [1.4.2]. 
 133 Attorney-General’s Department, Protocol, above n 125, cl 7.1. 
 134 ASIO Act s 34P. In November 2005, then IGIS, Ian Carnell, informed the PJCAAD that he 
had attended 20 of the 21 days of questioning carried out under the first three warrants issued 
thus far. See PJCAAD, Questioning and Detention Powers, above n 25, 13 [1.4.1]. Carnell 
made similar statements in 2009, stating that he had ‘sat in on much of the questioning’ that 
had occurred: see Ian Carnell, ‘The Role of the IGIS and Some Recent Developments’ (Speech 
delivered at the Supreme and Federal Court Judges’ Conference, Hobart, 26 January 2009) 6. 
The two most recent reports issued by the IGIS confirm that it is still common practice to 
attend questioning where possible. The IGIS supervised the questioning which occurred in 
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also be made by the Prescribed Authority on his or her own initiative. The 
main limitation on the Prescribed Authority’s power to make directions is that 
they must generally be consistent with the terms of the warrant. The Pre-
scribed Authority may only make an inconsistent direction if it is authorised 
in writing by the Attorney-General or is necessary to address a concern ‘about 
impropriety or illegality’ raised by the IGIS.140 Therefore, it is possible that 
even if the Prescribed Authority perceived ASIO officers to be acting unlaw-
fully, he or she would not be able to stop the questioning unless the Attorney-
General approved or the IGIS had raised a similar concern. 
The power to make directions is something of a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, it means the Prescribed Authority is able, to a certain extent, to 
safeguard the interests of the person being questioned. On the other hand, the 
Prescribed Authority becomes intimately involved in the questioning process 
and cannot be described as an entirely detached observer. As with Issuing 
Authorities, the independence and impartiality of the Prescribed Authority 
from the executive branch is of critical importance.  
A Prescribed Authority is typically a former judge, that is, a person ‘who 
has served as a judge in one or more superior courts for a period of 5 years 
and no longer holds a commission as a judge of a superior court.’141 The High 
Court, Federal Court, Family Courts, and the Supreme and District Courts of 
each state and territory are all ‘superior courts’.142 The Prescribed Authority 
must consent to be appointed by the Attorney-General.143 If the Attorney-
General believes that there are insufficient people in this category, he or she 
may appoint a person who is currently serving as a judge of a state or territory 
superior court, and who has been in this position for at least five years.144 If, in 
turn, there are not enough people in this category, the Attorney-General may 
appoint a President or Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (‘AAT’) who has been on the legal roll for at least five years.145 To 
date, there have been sufficient numbers of former judges who have consented 
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to be appointed as Prescribed Authorities. Therefore, it has not been necessary 
to recruit from the latter two categories.146  
In our opinion, the power to appoint sitting judges and members of the 
AAT should be repealed. There are strong policy reasons for using judges to 
supervise the questioning process. First, the involvement of judges ensures a 
level of independence which is absent if the supervisory function is per-
formed by a member of the executive branch of government (such as a 
member of the AAT).147 Secondly, there is no apparent advantage to appoint-
ing sitting rather than former judges as Prescribed Authorities. Former judges 
tend to retain the same qualities of independence, impartiality and integrity 
that they possessed when they were sitting on the courts. Finally, there are 
clear disadvantages to the appointment of sitting judges. There is an argument 
that such appointments are unconstitutional.148 Regardless of whether this is 
so, the involvement of sitting judges in the non-judicial and, in some minds, 
oppressive questioning process may adversely affect the public’s confidence in 
the courts.149  
The actual questioning process is governed by rules set out in the legisla-
tion and, in particular, the Protocol. These rules allow for considerably more 
flexibility than do the ordinary rules of evidence and procedure applied by the 
Australian courts. The Protocol states that questioning should be conducted in 
a manner that is ‘humane’, ‘courteous’, and not ‘demeaning’, ‘unfair or 
oppressive in the circumstances’.150 In 2011, the INSLM reported that its 
inquiries had not ‘throw[n] up any cause for concern as to compliance’ with 
these requirements.151 This is supported by the findings of the IGIS. In 2009, 
the IGIS noted that the conduct of ASIO officers had been described as 
‘professional and appropriate’, and ‘very formal and certainly polite and 
dispassionate, if persistent’.152 Similar comments were made by the PJCAAD 
in a 2005 report.153 The PJCAAD did, however, receive submissions from 
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lawyers involved in the process who were highly critical of ASIO’s conduct.154 
Some claimed that ASIO asked repetitive and leading questions. Another 
suggested that the questioning was ‘quite circular and rambling’. Still more 
described it as a ‘fishing expedition’, with ‘much of the questioning … relating 
to historic circumstances and with no connection with any imminent terrorist 
threat.’155 Finally, one lawyer claimed: ‘tracts of questioning were not intelli-
gence gathering; they were for no other purpose than preparing ground for a 
possible prosecution for giving false and misleading answers.’156 
The Protocol states that the subject of the warrant must at all times be pro-
vided with facilities that the Prescribed Authorities regard as appropriate for 
making a complaint to the IGIS, the Australian Federal Police (‘AFP’) Com-
missioner, the Commonwealth Ombudsman or another complaints body.157 
However, in 2005, the PJCAAD reported that a Prescribed Authority had 
refused permission for questioning to be stopped so that the subject of the 
warrant could make a complaint to the IGIS (who was not present at the 
time).158 This indicates the considerable discretion that the Prescribed 
Authority has in determining how the questioning will proceed.  
2 Time Limits on Questioning 
The maximum period of time that a warrant may be in force is 28 days, 
although a shorter period of time may be specified in the warrant itself.159 If, 
before the expiry of this period, the Director-General is satisfied that the 
grounds on which the warrant was issued have ‘ceased to exist’, he or she must 
discontinue the warrant and ‘take such steps as are necessary to ensure that 
action under the warrant is discontinued’.160 
A person (regardless of age) may be questioned for at least eight hours.161 
The Prescribed Authority may thereafter grant two eight-hour extensions of 
time (up to a maximum of 24 hours of questioning).162 Such extensions may 
only be granted if the Prescribed Authority is ‘satisfied that … there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that permitting the continuation will 
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substantially assist the collection of intelligence that is important in relation to 
a terrorism offence’ and questioning has so far been conducted ‘properly and 
without delay’.163 To date, extensions of time have been requested, and in each 
case granted, at least five (and possibly six) times.164  
In his 2011 report, the INSLM noted that ‘[a] questioning period of 24 
hours is quite remote from the ordinary experience of Australians. On any 
view, it is an extraordinary power.’165 However, the power is even more 
extraordinary than the INSLM’s report suggests. It is possible for a person to 
be questioned for considerably longer than the 24-hour time limit. This is 
because certain periods of time are not taken into account when calculating 
the questioning time that has elapsed. These periods include: the time taken 
by the Prescribed Authority to give the required explanations when the 
person first appears for questioning; any breaks in questioning (30 minutes 
every four hours for adults and every two hours for minors);166 and ‘any other 
time determined by a prescribed authority before whom the person appears 
for questioning.’167 The breadth of the latter is of particular concern. A similar 
‘dead time’ provision in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (‘Commonwealth Crimes 
Act’) has been strongly criticised for effectively permitting indefinite deten-
tion.168 The PJCAAD’s 2005 report demonstrates that questioning is typically 
spread ‘over a number of days’169 and people tend to be questioned from early 
in the morning until late in the afternoon.170  
If an interpreter is provided to the person being questioned, a different set 
of time limits apply. An interpreter must be provided — either on the initia-
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tive of the Prescribed Authority171 or at the request of the person being 
questioned172 — if the Prescribed Authority ‘believes on reasonable grounds 
that the person is unable, because of inadequate knowledge of the English 
language or a physical disability, to communicate with reasonable fluency in 
that language.’173 The provision of an interpreter is an important safeguard for 
the person being questioned. It ensures that he or she will understand the 
information being provided to him or her, is able to obtain proper advice 
from his or her lawyer and can make informed decisions about how to 
respond to ASIO’s questions. However, there is also a considerable disad-
vantage to being provided with an interpreter. If an interpreter ‘is present at 
any time while a person is questioned’,174 the person may be questioned for 
twice as long: that is, for an initial period of 16 hours and, with the two 
possible extensions of time, up to a maximum of 48 hours.175 The phrase ‘at 
any time’ suggests that this increased time limit applies even if the majority of 
questioning occurs without an interpreter. In the year ending June 2004, one 
person was questioned with the assistance of an interpreter for over 42 
hours.176 It is unclear whether an interpreter has been used on any other 
occasions.177 If an interpreter has been required on other occasions, ASIO has 
not relied upon the extended time limit. Nevertheless, the likely consequence 
of the extended time limit is ‘to inhibit a subject asking for the use of [an 
interpreter], even where that might be advisable.’178 A more flexible provision 
that permitted time to be extended, but only for so long as was reasonably 
necessary to accommodate the interpreter, would be preferable.179 
3 Coercive Nature of Questioning 
Questioning under the Special Powers Regime is coercive. Failure to appear 
for questioning, to answer ASIO’s questions or to give ASIO the requested 
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records or things, or to give ASIO false or misleading information is a 
criminal offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment.180 Such a regime is 
unusual. Australians are generally understood to enjoy a right to silence. A 
person is not, for example, obliged to answer questions asked by a police 
officer.181 This is, of course, only a general rule and is, at times, subject to 
exceptions.182 Certain federal, state and territory bodies, such as the Australi-
an Crime Commission and the Independent Commission against Corruption, 
are also given coercive questioning powers.183 Even where a person is subject 
to a regime of coercive questioning, he or she will generally be entitled to 
refuse to give information on the basis of the privilege against self-
incrimination. That is, that giving the information would tend to expose him 
or her to conviction for a crime or, in some cases, the imposition of a civil 
penalty.184 The privilege against self-incrimination is absent from the Special 
Powers Regime.  
In his 2011 report, the INSLM stated that the circumstances in which co-
ercive questioning is permitted are so broad that ‘there is no objection in 
principle to such compulsory powers of questioning.’185 There can be no 
doubt that, at times, the right to silence and privilege against self-
incrimination are restricted in order to serve more pressing purposes. 
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However, the INSLM did not appreciate the fundamental difference between 
the Special Powers Regime and the other circumstances in which coercive 
questioning is permitted. The Special Powers Regime gives coercive question-
ing powers to an intelligence-gathering — rather than a law enforcement — 
body in a non-criminal context. The right to silence and privilege against self-
incrimination lie at the heart of liberal democracies. They protect the privacy 
and autonomy of the individual against the state. They also support the 
presumption of innocence and the idea that the state should bear the burden 
of proving criminal guilt. It would therefore be very dangerous to look at 
coercive questioning as the new norm. Instead, we should only accept its 
extension to new circumstances where there is a clear justification.186  
The coercive nature of the questioning power was justified by the then 
Coalition government on the following basis:  
In some situations, a person with highly relevant information may refuse to 
volunteer it. For example, a terrorist sympathiser who may know of a planned 
bombing of a busy building but who will not actually take part in the bombing 
may decline to help authorities thwart the attack. In order for the new powers 
to be effective, it is necessary that penalties apply in relation to the failure to an-
swer questions accurately or produce documents or other requested things.187 
More recently, coercive questioning was said to be ‘particularly useful 
where the threat of terrorism is immediate and other methods of intelligence 
collection will be … too slow’.188 In relation to the privilege against self-
incrimination specifically, the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the 
ASIO Bill (No 1) explained that it was removed 
to maximise the likelihood that information will be given or records or things 
produced that may assist to avert terrorism offences. The protection of the 
community from such violence is, in this special case, considered to be more 
important than the privilege against self-incrimination.189 
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The problem with these justifications is that they are not reflected in the 
criteria for issuing a Questioning Warrant. The legislation does not require 
any proof of imminent danger or that the intelligence sought is capable of 
preventing a terrorism offence before coercive questioning is permitted.190  
There are significant restrictions upon what ASIO may do with the infor-
mation once it has been obtained through the questioning process. 
‘[A]nything said by the person’ or records or things produced by the person 
‘while before a prescribed authority for questioning under a warrant, in 
response to a request made in accordance with the warrant for the person to 
give information’ cannot be used in criminal proceedings against the person 
(‘use immunity’).191 The conferral of use immunity is a clear improvement on 
the ASIO Bill (No 1). This Bill would have allowed information obtained 
through the questioning process to be used against the person in a criminal 
prosecution.192  
The information may still be used in four ways. First, it may be used in 
proceedings for failing to comply with the terms of the warrant or giving false 
or misleading information.193 Secondly, the use immunity only applies to 
criminal proceedings. The information may therefore be used in civil pro-
ceedings, for example, as the basis for deporting the person, cancelling their 
passport or obtaining a control order.194 Thirdly, the use immunity only 
applies to proceedings against the person giving the information. The 
information may still be used as evidence in the criminal prosecution of 
another person. Finally, there is no derivative use immunity. This means that 
information obtained during questioning may be used to gather other 
information which may, in turn, be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
For example, if the name of an associate was given during questioning, ASIO 
could then contact that person and ask him or her to give evidence in 
criminal proceedings. Similarly, if the location of explosive materials was 
revealed, ASIO could use those physical materials as evidence in criminal 
proceedings. This stands in sharp contrast to Canada’s now-lapsed investiga-
tive hearing regime, which is the closest international comparator to the 
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Special Powers Regime. Information obtained under the investigative hearing 
regime was protected by both use and derivative use immunities.195 
B  Detention 
Citizens in modern, liberal democratic states have a fundamental expectation 
that they will not be deprived of their liberty without good reason. One of the 
authors of this article wrote in 2002 that ‘[t]his principle underpins Australia’s 
democratic system and the separation of powers entrenched by the Australian 
Constitution’.196 As a general rule, the involuntary detention of a citizen may 
only be ordered by a court after a finding of criminal guilt or as an adjunct to 
the judicial process.197 There are some well-established exceptions to this in 
Australia. Hence, the executive may order the ‘non-punitive’ detention of a 
citizen for a pressing public purpose, in particular, to protect the community 
from non-criminals who nevertheless pose a risk to public health or safety. 
For example, the executive may quarantine people with infectious diseases or 
confine people with serious mental illnesses.198 Despite these exceptions, 
executive detention continues to be viewed warily, and is generally only 
permitted where it is justified on strong grounds.  
The Special Powers Regime empowers ASIO to request the detention of a 
non-suspect for the purpose of intelligence-gathering. This is an unprecedent-
ed development. No other democratic country in the Western world has given 
a power of detention to its domestic intelligence agency.199 In introducing the 
ASIO Bill (No 1), the Coalition government insisted that the power to detain 
was a necessary tool for preventing terrorist attacks. Without it, ‘terrorists 
could be warned before they are caught, planned acts of terrorism known to 
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ASIO could be rescheduled rather than prevented, and valuable evidence 
could be destroyed.’200 The ability to detain non-suspects will, in some 
circumstances, ‘be critical’ to protect public safety.201 Furthermore:  
Those at the front line in meeting this threat tell us that, in order to protect the 
community from this kind of threat, they need the power to hold a person in-
communicado, subject to strict safeguards, while questioning for the purpose of 
intelligence gathering. We accept this need …202 
The power to detain has not yet been used. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand, even in the abstract, the scope and operation of this power. A 
Detention Warrant, as the name suggests, provides that the person subject to 
the warrant is to be taken into detention. It is not ASIO who takes the person 
into custody. Nor is it ASIO who holds the person for the period of the 
Detention Warrant. Rather, these functions are performed by police offic-
ers.203 Given this, it might be argued that there is no problem with the 
extension of the power to detain, which obviously already exists in the law 
enforcement context, for the purpose of intelligence gathering. However, this 
argument cannot be sustained. There is a fundamental difference between the 
power of law enforcement officers to detain and the Special Powers Regime. 
The former are only permitted to detain persons suspected of committing an 
offence.204 
Under the Special Powers Regime, police officers may enter and search any 
premises where they reasonably believe the person is, and may also use 
reasonable force in order to take the person into custody.205 These powers are 
broadly similar to those granted to the AFP in arresting a person suspected of 
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committing a crime.206 However, there is a critical difference. When arresting 
a person, the AFP officer must usually inform him or her of the nature of the 
crime of which they are suspected.207 In executing a Detention Warrant, the 
AFP officer need not give the person any information about the grounds for 
the warrant.  
As already noted above, once a person is detained, he or she must be ‘im-
mediately’ brought before a Prescribed Authority.208 This ensures that the 
Prescribed Authority is in charge of the detention and questioning process 
right from the beginning and guards against abuses of process by ASIO or the 
AFP. In contrast, a person subject to a Questioning Warrant is not initially 
taken into custody. He or she is simply served with a copy of the warrant and 
required to attend for questioning at a stipulated time. There are, however, two 
circumstances in which a person subject to a Questioning Warrant may be 
detained. First, failure to attend before the Prescribed Authority as prescribed 
by the Questioning Warrant is a criminal offence.209 Therefore, if the person 
fails to attend, the police may arrest him or her.210 Secondly, the Prescribed 
Authority may direct that a person the subject of a Questioning Warrant be 
detained.211 Broadly speaking, the Prescribed Authority may make such a 
direction if he or she is satisfied of the basic criteria and additional detention 
criterion set out above.212  
A person may be detained for a maximum of seven days.213 For a person 
subject to a Detention Warrant, this period starts when the person is first 
brought before the Prescribed Authority.214 For a person detained at the 
direction of the Prescribed Authority, it starts when the direction to detain is 
made.215 The person must be released before the seven days have elapsed if 
one of the following events occurs: ASIO informs the Prescribed Authority 
that it has no more questions to ask; the Prescribed Authority directs that the 
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person be released; or the person has been questioned for the maximum 
period of time.216 These provisions ostensibly ensure that a person is detained 
only for the purpose of questioning relevant to a terrorism investigation. It is, 
however, instructive to compare the time limits on detention under the 
Special Powers Regime with the pre-charge detention of terrorism suspects by 
the AFP. Such a comparison indicates that the Regime is not adequately 
tailored to the purpose of investigating terrorism offences. A person detained 
under the Regime — who is potentially a non-suspect — may be held for up 
to seven times longer than a suspect by the AFP.217 This is a striking and 
concerning difference. In his 2011 report, the INSLM suggested that there is 
‘no appreciable operational benefit’ that had been put forward to justify a 
seven-day time limit (rather than some shorter period of time).218  
The ASIO Act does not set out in any detail the conditions under which a 
person is to be detained. These conditions will be determined ‘under ar-
rangements made by a police officer’,219 although they ‘must be consistent 
with applicable police practices and procedures in relation to custody of 
persons.’220 The ASIO Act does, however, provide that a detained person may 
be searched by a police officer. This can take the form of an ordinary search or, 
subject to additional criteria and strict procedures, a strip search.221 There is 
nothing extraordinary about this provision. It is broadly similar to the 
position of suspects detained by the police.222 The ASIO Act does provide for 
some additional protections for minors. A person between the ages of 16 and 
18 may only be strip-searched at the direction of the Prescribed Authority 
and, if such a direction is made, the search must take place in the presence of 
their parent or guardian.223 More detailed guidelines about the day-to-day 
conditions in which a person may be detained are contained in the Protocol. 
For example, the Protocol states that the person must be properly supervised 
and given adequate food, water and sanitary facilities.224 He or she must be 
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given the opportunity to sleep uninterrupted for eight hours every day225 and 
to engage in religious practices required by the person’s religion.226 
C  Access to a Lawyer 
A person subject to a Questioning or Detention Warrant ostensibly has the 
right to a lawyer of his or her choice.227 This is a significant improvement on 
the ASIO Bill (No 1). That Bill would have denied a detainee access to a 
lawyer for the first 48 hours of detention.228 In the criminal context, the right 
to a lawyer of one’s choice is recognised by Australian common law and 
international law as being of critical importance.229 Of course, the questioning 
of a person under the Special Powers Regime is not a criminal investigation. 
Nevertheless, the Regime may have serious (and even criminal) implications. 
First, the information obtained during the questioning process may be used 
indirectly as the basis for terrorism or other criminal prosecutions against the 
person. Secondly, a person has a long list of complicated obligations under a 
Questioning or Detention Warrant. These include the obligation to answer 
ASIO’s questions and the prohibition on disclosing information about the 
warrant. If the person fails to comply with these obligations, they face the 
possibility of a lengthy period of imprisonment. Finally, the provisions in the 
ASIO Act for challenging the legality of a particular warrant or a person’s 
treatment by ASIO or the police will likely only be effective if the person can 
obtain legal advice. For all these reasons, it is vital that persons subject to a 
warrant are given adequate access to legal representation and advice. Howev-
er, as the Special Powers Regime currently stands, there are a number of 
significant limitations on the right to legal representation that undermine this 
apparent protection. 
The most significant limitation is that the Prescribed Authority may pro-
hibit a person from contacting a particular lawyer if it is satisfied that: 
 (a) a person involved in a terrorism offence may be alerted that the offence is being 
investigated; or 
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 (b) a record or thing that the person may be requested in accordance with the 
warrant to produce may be destroyed, damaged or altered.230 
If the person’s first choice of lawyer is vetoed by the Prescribed Authority, 
he or she may contact another lawyer. However, that lawyer may then be 
vetoed (and so on).231 It is unclear whether the veto power has ever been used. 
Even if it has not, that should not be the end of the matter. The right to a 
lawyer of one’s choosing is so fundamental that it must only be restricted or 
abrogated where there is good reason to do so. For example, under the 
Commonwealth Crimes Act, the AFP may deny a person access to a lawyer of 
their choice in ‘exceptional circumstances’.232 In 2002, Attorney-General 
Daryl Williams accepted that depriving a person of access to a lawyer of his or 
her choice would be generally unacceptable. It would only be acceptable in 
‘extreme circumstances’ in which ‘there may be imminent danger to the 
community.’233 The problem with this justification is that there is no require-
ment of ‘extreme’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances in the Special Powers Regime. 
The circumstances in which the right to a lawyer of one’s choosing may be 
restricted are far broader. Therefore, persons subject to a Questioning or 
Detention Warrant must hope that ASIO, in applying for a lawyer to be 
vetoed, and the Prescribed Authority, in making the ultimate decision, 
exercise restraint.  
The right conferred by the ASIO Act is really just a right for the person to 
‘contact’ a lawyer. It is not a substantive right to legal representation and 
advice. This is so for a number of reasons. First, as already discussed, a 
person’s lawyer of choice may be vetoed by the Prescribed Authority. Second-
ly, the person may be questioned before they have been able to consult with 
their lawyer.234 Thirdly, the lawyer must play a very passive role in the 
questioning. Fourthly, the lawyer may be excluded from the questioning in 
certain circumstances. Finally, there is no right for a person to communicate 
with his or her lawyer in private. Each of these points will now be discussed in 
turn. Their cumulative effect is to make very significant inroads into the right 
to legal representation and advice.  
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The Prescribed Authority may — but is not obligated to — defer question-
ing until the person’s lawyer arrives.235 In 2005, the PJCAAD reported that 
‘[a]lmost all persons who have been subject to questioning warrants have had 
access to legal representation at all times.’236 In our opinion, ‘almost’ is not 
good enough. Again, the Special Powers Regime contrasts sharply with the 
position under the Commonwealth Crimes Act. There is a general right under 
the Commonwealth Crimes Act to have questioning deferred for a reasonable 
time until the person has communicated with his or her lawyer and, after that, 
to wait a reasonable time to allow that person to attend the questioning. This 
right may be abrogated, but only in circumstances far more limited than 
under the Special Powers Regime. In addition to proof that ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ exist, the investigating officer must also reasonably believe that 
the questioning is so urgent, having regard to the safety of other people, that it 
should not be delayed.237 In any event, even if the questioning is not deferred, 
the person being questioned may nevertheless refuse to answer any questions 
until he or she has received legal advice. This is so because he or she, unlike 
persons being questioned under the Special Powers Regime, is entitled to the 
right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination.238 This will be 
discussed in more detail in Part IVD below. In the absence of such rights, 
persons subject to a Questioning or Detention Warrant should at the very 
least be entitled to a deferral of questioning for a reasonable time until legal 
advice has been obtained. 
Where the lawyer is present during the questioning, he or she must play a 
passive role. He or she is not permitted to ask questions, cross-examine or 
‘intervene in questioning … except to request clarification of an ambiguous 
question.’239 This is reinforced by the fact that lawyers are not seated next to 
their clients during the questioning. The subject of the warrant is either placed 
in the witness box or, at the very least, there is an ASIO officer between him or 
her and the lawyer.240 The Prescribed Authority may — but need not — 
permit the lawyer to address him or her during a break in questioning.241 The 
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Prescribed Authority may also direct an ASIO or police officer to remove the 
lawyer from the questioning room if the Prescribed Authority ‘considers the 
legal adviser’s conduct is unduly disrupt[ive]’.242 If this occurs, the person 
being questioned must be permitted to contact another lawyer but, once 
again, there is no requirement to defer questioning until the new lawyer 
arrives.243 As at 2005, this power to remove a lawyer had not been used.244 
However, the possibility of eviction may result in the lawyer being more of an 
observer than active participant. These issues may account for the complaint 
made by many lawyers that the questioning process is inherently ‘unfair’.245 
The ASIO Act states that the Special Powers Regime ‘does not affect the law 
relating to legal professional privilege.’246 However, there are two problems 
with the scope of this apparent protection. The first problem is that a person is 
not able to communicate with his or her lawyer in private. Confidentiality is 
central to the effective operation of legal professional privilege. A person 
arrested by the AFP and charged with an offence is entitled to communicate 
with his or her lawyer in private.247 In contrast, all contact between a person 
subject to a Detention Warrant and his or her lawyer ‘must be made in a way 
that can be monitored by a person exercising authority under the warrant.’248 
The same rule applies to communications between a person subject to a 
Questioning Warrant and his or her lawyer except to the extent that commu-
nication occurs while ‘the person is appearing before a prescribed authority 
for questioning’.249 This exception likely exists because such communications 
are already made in front of the more than 10 persons present in the question-
ing room.250 All other communications between a person subject to a Ques-
tioning Warrant and his or her lawyer, including during breaks in questioning 
and once the person has returned home at the end of the day, must be capable 
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of being monitored.251 Whether and how those communications are actually 
monitored is not clear.  
In practice, Prescribed Authorities generally allow a person subject to a 
Questioning or Detention Warrant and his or her lawyer to communicate in 
private.252 The important point, however, is that the right to privacy is not 
guaranteed by the ASIO Act. The constant fear of surveillance means that a 
person may refuse to speak freely and candidly with his or her lawyer. There 
may be understandable concern that ASIO will use any conversations that it 
overhears as the basis for further investigations (if not evidence in and of 
itself).253 If this is the case, the person will be unable to provide his or her 
lawyer with adequate instructions, the lawyer will not be able to give proper 
advice and the person will be deprived of the real protection of the legal 
professional privilege.254 This problem is exacerbated by the limited infor-
mation that the lawyer is given about the basis for the warrant. ASIO must 
provide the lawyer with a copy of the warrant. However, this does not include 
the evidence on which it is based.255 This is so even if the lawyer has a security 
clearance.256  
Secondly, legal professional privilege generally only applies to communica-
tions made in confidence.257 As the vast majority of communications between 
a person subject to a Questioning or Detention Warrant and his or her lawyer 
are monitored by ASIO (and are therefore not confidential), it is questionable 
whether they are actually protected by legal professional privilege at all.258 
Therefore, the Special Powers Regime attacks ‘the heart of the basis of the 
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relationship between client and lawyer, on which [the legal professional 
privilege] is predicated’.259  
When introducing the Special Powers Regime into the Commonwealth 
Parliament, the government claimed that terrorism was ‘not like ordinary 
crime … [as] the destruction that acts of terrorism can cause distinguish 
terrorism from other types of crime’.260 The Powers were thus intended to 
serve a preventative (rather than law enforcement) purpose.261 It was said that 
this purpose necessitated the removal of safeguards that would be expected in 
the criminal justice system.262 However, it is clear from the above analysis that 
the restrictions on access to legal representation and advice are not always 
tailored to a preventative purpose. In some instances, these restrictions apply 
only where ASIO is able to demonstrate particular facts, for example, that 
contact with a particular lawyer may lead to the destruction of evidence. In 
others, no factual basis is required — for example, the rule that all contact 
between a person subject to a Detention Warrant and his or her lawyer must 
be capable of being monitored. This is of great concern given the serious 
criminal consequences that may arise from the Special Powers Regime, and 
the fact that it may be used against a broad range of persons including non-
suspects and minors.  
D  Secrecy Provisions 
ASIO has typically conducted its intelligence-gathering activities under a 
cloak of secrecy.263 For example, there is a blanket ban on directly or indirectly 
disclosing, without the permission of the Attorney-General or the Director-
General, the name or identity of an ASIO officer, employee or agent or 
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someone ‘in any way connected with’ one of these persons.264 This level of 
secrecy is arguably appropriate given the goals of intelligence-gathering; 
namely, the detection and investigation of potentially dangerous activities at a 
very early point in time. The problem is that the Special Powers Regime vests 
ASIO with coercive questioning and detention powers that have traditionally 
been reserved for law enforcement agencies in the criminal context. Where 
these powers are exercised by law enforcement agencies, they are generally 
subject to high levels of oversight and scrutiny. The same does not apply to the 
Special Powers Regime. ASIO’s cloak of secrecy is extended to this Regime. 
We have already discussed the ‘closed’ nature of questioning. That is, the 
public is given no access to, or information about, the questioning process. 
This section will examine two other aspects of the secrecy surrounding the 
Special Powers Regime: first, restrictions on communications per se; secondly, 
restrictions on the content of communications.  
1 Restrictions on Communications Per Se 
A person subject to a Questioning Warrant may communicate with any 
person unless specifically prohibited by the Prescribed Authority.265 This is 
only logical. It would be ridiculous for a person to be prohibited from 
speaking to family or friends when he or she returns home at the end of each 
day of questioning. In contrast, the ASIO Act places significant restrictions on 
the ability of a person subject to a Detention Warrant to contact outsiders. The 
starting point is that ‘[a] person who has been taken into custody, or de-
tained … is not permitted to contact, and may be prevented from contacting, 
anyone at any time while in custody in detention.’266  
There are four main exceptions to this. First, the ASIO Act provides that a 
person may contact the statutory officials responsible for overseeing the 
operation of the Special Powers Regime. These include the IGIS, the Com-
monwealth Ombudsman and the AFP Commissioner.267 To this end, the 
person must be given the facilities necessary to make a complaint.268 He or she 
must also be allowed, at any time, to lodge an application for judicial review of 
the warrant and/or his or her treatment.269 These provisions play a significant 
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role in ensuring that a person’s rights are not breached. The ASIO Act sets out 
a number of offences that may be committed by ASIO or police officers in the 
exercise of their powers under the Special Powers Regime.270 For example, it is 
an offence to breach the requirement in s 34T that persons subject to a 
warrant ‘must be treated with humanity and with respect for human dignity, 
and must not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’. Without 
the ability for detainees to contact complaints bodies, these offences would be 
rendered ineffective.  
The next two exceptions are closely related: the Detention Warrant may 
specify persons or classes of persons whom the detainee may contact;271 
and/or the Prescribed Authority may direct that the detainee be allowed to 
contact a person not specified in the warrant.272 If, however, no persons are 
specified in the Detention Warrant or in a direction, the detainee may not 
contact anyone else: family, friends, employers or a medical professional. 
Young persons aged between 16 and 18 are given somewhat greater protec-
tion. A young person subject to a Detention Warrant must be permitted to 
contact a parent or guardian.273  
This blanket prohibition on outside contact seems disproportionate. There 
is no need for ASIO to prove that such contact poses (or even may pose) a 
security risk. To date, no clear explanation has been given by ASIO of the 
need for this blanket rule. Even if restrictions on outside contact are justified 
in the interest of national security, the question nevertheless remains whether 
lesser restrictions upon communication would suffice. For example, there 
could be a requirement that any contact between the detainee and outsiders 
be monitored by ASIO or AFP officers (except contact between the detainee 
and his or her lawyer which, we would argue for the reasons above, should 
generally be confidential). In judging what restrictions are appropriate, it must 
be kept in mind that there are already criminal offences prohibiting disclosure 
of even the fact of a warrant (discussed below) as well as a requirement that 
any communications between the detainee and his lawyer must be capable of 
being monitored.274 These make it unlikely that a person would, while in 
detention, reveal information that might threaten national security.  
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The final exception relates to a person’s right to contact a lawyer ‘at any 
time that is a time the person is in detention in connection with the war-
rant’.275 ‘At any time’ should not, however, be read literally. As has been 
discussed in Part IVC above, the right to contact a lawyer is far more limited 
than this. The right only arises ‘after … the person has been brought before a 
prescribed authority for questioning’ and after ASIO has had an opportunity 
to veto the person’s lawyer of choice for security reasons.276 
2 Restrictions on the Content of Communications 
The ASIO Act imposes restrictions on the content of communications between 
persons subject to either a Questioning or Detention Warrant and any other 
person. Section 34ZS of the ASIO Act contains two ‘secrecy offences’. These 
offences were introduced in late 2003, only a few months after the enactment 
of the Special Powers Regime.277 The Coalition government insisted that they 
were necessary to prevent a person subject to a warrant from warning other 
people about an ongoing terrorism-related investigation and ‘jeopardi[sing] 
efforts to stop such an attack.’278 This is a legitimate and important goal. 
However, the real question is whether the secrecy offences are appropriately 
tailored to this goal. 
The first offence provides that, for the period of time that a warrant is in 
effect, a person may not disclose any information that ‘indicates the fact that a 
warrant has been issued or a fact relating to the content of the warrant or to 
the questioning or detention of a person in connection with the warrant’.279 
This offence is too broad. It prohibits the disclosure of information which 
could in no way jeopardise a terrorism-related investigation.280 The prohibi-
tion on disclosing even the fact of a warrant may be appropriate in certain 
circumstances: for example, where evidence is provided to the Prescribed 
Authority which demonstrates that the subject of the warrant may tip off a 
potential terrorist. Such a person is likely to already be the subject of a 
Detention (rather than a Questioning) Warrant. As discussed in Part III 
above, a Detention Warrant may be sought and issued where there is evidence 
that the person may alert another person involved in a terrorism offence to 
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the ongoing ASIO investigation. Such a person could, if necessary, have their 
communications restricted under the detention regime. The secrecy offences 
would not be required.  
In any event, the Special Powers Regime is not limited to this category of 
persons. Amongst other things, it extends to non-suspects. A person might 
therefore be brought in for questioning simply on the basis of what they have 
observed (that is, an ‘innocent bystander’). In circumstances where there is no 
evidence that the person has any involvement with terrorism or relationship 
with potential terrorists, there is no reason for prohibiting them from 
informing an outsider of the fact that they are being questioned. This prohibi-
tion will have a simple but profound impact on the person being questioned. 
As explained above, questioning may be spread out over a number of days, 
and last from morning until afternoon. A person subject to a warrant will be 
unable to explain this absence to their employer or their family.  
It is also an offence, while the warrant is in effect and for two years after-
wards, to disclose operational information that a person has as a direct or 
indirect result of the issue or execution of the warrant.281 This offence, like the 
first, is overly broad. ‘Operational information’ is not limited to information 
the disclosure of which might pose a risk to national security. It includes 
‘information indicating … information that [ASIO] has or had’; a ‘source of 
information’ (other than the person subject to the warrant) or ‘an operational 
capability, method or plan of [ASIO]’.282 The period of time after the expiry of 
a warrant for which it is an offence to disclose operational information — two 
years — is also a cause for concern. This is particularly so given the very 
limited categories of ‘permitted disclosure’.283 Some of these categories are 
undoubtedly significant. For example, information may be provided to the 
IGIS or Commonwealth Ombudsman in the course of performing their 
statutory duties. In legal terms, this means that operational information may 
be disclosed by a person if it is necessary for him or her to make an official 
complaint. The practical effect may be somewhat different. The ‘chilling’ effect 
of the secrecy offences was evident in the PJCAAD’s 2005 report, where the 
PJCAAD complained of the difficulty in obtaining evidence about the use of 
the Special Powers.284 Further, a person may wish to have alleged abuses of 
power assessed in public rather than by making an official complaint. Such 
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potential abuses are not permitted to be revealed to the public for at least two 
years after the warrant has expired. By this time, it ‘will be next to impossible 
to obtain … eyewitness and first-hand accounts … of much of ASIO’s 
activities.285 Other ‘permitted disclosures’ relevant to the subject of the 
warrant include communications between the person and his or her lawyer 
and disclosures covered by the implied constitutional freedom of political 
communication. The latter provides little reassurance as it would fall upon the 
person seeking to defend their disclosure to prove that it was covered by the 
implied freedom of political communication. Few people would be willing to 
risk five years’ imprisonment in the hope that they would be able to prove 
this.286 These exceptions are insufficient. A person is not, for example, able to 
discuss their experiences with their family or doctor or to explain their 
absence from work to their employer. This exacerbates the punitive impact of 
the Regime.287 
There are a number of other ‘technical’ concerns about the secrecy offenc-
es. First, the penalties for breach are arguably disproportionate. The maxi-
mum penalty is five years’ imprisonment. This contrasts unfavourably with 
the maximum two years’ imprisonment that may be imposed against ASIO 
and police officers who misuse their powers.288 Secondly, if the person making 
the disclosure is the person subject to the warrant or their lawyer, the offence 
is one of strict liability (otherwise, the disclosure need only be ‘reckless’).289 
V  U S E  O F  T H E  SP E C IA L  POW E R S  R E G I M E  
ASIO is required to provide statistics about the use of the Special Powers 
Regime in its Annual Report to the Commonwealth Parliament.290 The 
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following table provides a breakdown of the Questioning and Detention 
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2006 1 1 1 4:20 4.20 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 1 1 5:48 5.48 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 
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The first lesson that may be taken from the table is that every application 
for a Questioning Warrant (16 in total) has been granted. There are two ways 
of interpreting this statistic. On the one hand, it might add weight to our 
concerns about the lack of rigour in the issuing process. Alternatively, it could 
mean that ASIO exercises restraint, only applying for warrants where there is 
‘good reason’ for doing so. This latter conclusion is supported by the IGIS.292  
Secondly, Questioning Warrants have been used infrequently; on average, 
only twice a year. Between 2003 and the end of 2005, 14 warrants were issued. 
However, in the seven years since, only two Questioning Warrants have been 
issued. It might be guessed (although it is impossible to conclude) that 
Questioning Warrants were used more frequently in the early period because 
they were novel and ASIO was ‘testing the waters’. It may have been found that 
such warrants were of limited use, especially given that they run counter to 
ASIO’s normal modus operandi of covert surveillance. Issuing a warrant 
obviously alerts a subject to ASIO’s interest in them, and so may compromise 
future opportunities to gather intelligence. 
Thirdly, in the early period, there was a rough correlation between the 
number of Questioning Warrants issued and the number of persons charged 
with terrorism offences. In the year ending 30 June 2004, three Questioning 
Warrants were issued. During that year, three men were also charged with 
terrorism offences.293 In the year ending 30 June 2005, 11 Questioning 
Warrants were issued. One man was arrested on terrorism charges in this 
year294 and a further 22 men were arrested just a few months afterwards (in 
November 2005).295 There is no longer even a rough correlation between the 
use of the Special Powers Regime and terrorism prosecutions. The use of 
Questioning Warrants has sharply declined since 2005. However, this has not 
been matched by a corresponding decline in the laying of terrorism charges. 
Since the beginning of 2006, a further 10 men have been charged with 
terrorism offences.296 Six of these men were convicted. Australia’s official 
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terrorism alert level has remained at ‘medium’,297 and ASIO has continued to 
report that the threat of terrorism is ‘very real’.298 Yet, in the period from 2006 
to 2012, only two Questioning Warrants were sought by ASIO. None at all 
were sought between June 2010 and June 2012. In May 2011, the Director-
General said: ‘Each year ASIO responds to literally thousands of counterter-
rorism leads … we are currently involved in several hundred counterterror-
ism investigations and inquiries.’299  
Despite this, Questioning Warrants do not seem to be being used, either to 
enable arrests or gather intelligence. The inescapable conclusion seems to be 
that ASIO does not regard the Special Powers as particularly useful and that 
Questioning Warrants are not an essential weapon in the fight against 
terrorism.  
Fourthly, there is a real (albeit relatively slim) possibility of repeat warrants 
being issued. In the year ending 30 June 2005, one person was the subject of 
two separate Questioning Warrants. It is unclear how long this person was 
questioned for under each warrant or the reasons why a repeat warrant was 
issued. Nevertheless, this statistic reinforces that the 24-hour time limit on 
questioning is not, of itself, a guarantee against lengthy detention. 
Finally, no Detention Warrant has been either sought or issued (although 
ASIO had ‘considered’ making an application on one occasion).300 Further, no 
person has been detained pursuant to a Questioning Warrant.301 ASIO has 
offered no public explanation for this statistic. It has made no attempt to 
explain why the detention power continues to be required despite not having 
been used once in the last decade. Practical and political factors mean that it 
is highly doubtful whether a Detention Warrant will ever be sought. When the 
Special Powers Regime was enacted, the AFP had no additional power to 
detain terrorism suspects for interrogation. Criminal suspects — both 
terrorists and otherwise — could only be questioned for a maximum of 12 
hours without charge.302 Therefore, Detention Warrants were regarded as 
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performing a crucial role in the investigation of terrorism. This is no longer 
the case. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) subsequently doubled the time for 
which terrorism suspects could be questioned (to 24 hours).303 It also gave a 
broad power to magistrates to declare periods of detention to be ‘dead time’. 
As such, these periods were disregarded in calculating whether the maximum 
24 hours had elapsed.304 For many years there was no limit on the amount of 
‘dead time’. The National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) 
introduced a seven-day limit on certain categories of dead time.305 This ‘dead 
time’ regime means that the AFP has the power to question and detain 
suspects for at least as long as under the Special Powers Regime. Given that 
the AFP would be expected to take the lead role in a terrorism investigation, 
this leaves little need for ASIO to exercise its detention powers. The only 
situation in which there is still an arguable need for these powers is in respect 
of non-suspects. However, it is very unlikely that the additional detention 
criterion could be satisfied in respect of non-suspects. ASIO will also no 
doubt be alert to the public reaction that detention of a person, especially a 
non-suspect, might provoke. The case of Dr Mohamed Haneef demonstrates 
how the use of extraordinary powers that contravene accepted community 
standards may cause considerable damage to the reputation of executive 
agencies.306 This suggests that it will take a truly extraordinary case for the 
detention power to be used (if at all). It is therefore questionable whether it is 
worthwhile retaining such extraordinary legislation. 
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The fact that ASIO has seldom used the Special Powers Regime does not 
necessarily mean it is unjustified. The former Coalition government acknowl-
edged that the Special Powers were ‘extraordinary measures’307 of ‘last 
resort’.308 The limited use of the Special Powers is, however, an important 
factor to take into account. In 2005, one of the bases for the PJCAAD’s 
recommendation that the Regime be renewed was that it had ‘been useful’ in 
enabling ASIO to monitor potential terrorists.309 It is unlikely the same could 
be said today. The Coalition government’s assertion that the Special Powers 
Regime is necessary to protect Australia from terrorism can no longer be 
maintained. It is difficult to justify the continuing existence of extraordinary 
powers which permit such significant inroads into fundamental human rights 
if they are also of little use at a time when the Director-General has said that 
ASIO is ‘involved in several hundred counterterrorism investigations and 
inquiries.’310 
VI  C O N C LU SI O N S 
The coercive questioning and detention powers conferred on ASIO by the 
Special Powers Regime are extraordinary. There is no precedent for such 
powers either in Australia or in other like nations. In 2003, after protracted 
debate, the Commonwealth Parliament concluded that these powers were 
necessary to protect Australia against the threat of terrorism. The Regime was 
accepted as an exceptional measure, and the inclusion of a sunset clause 
demonstrates that parliamentarians believed that it would be temporary. Ten 
years on, the Special Powers Regime can no longer fall back on these justifica-
tions. Today, a different question must be asked — whether there is a basis for 
the Special Powers Regime becoming a permanent feature of Australia’s legal 
landscape. This article has sought to answer this question by examining the 
legislative framework, in particular, the issuing criteria and the nature of the 
powers, as well as the actual use made of the powers.  
The most extraordinary aspect of the Special Powers Regime is the power 
of detention. By this, we mean both the power to issue a Detention Warrant 
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and also the power for a Prescribed Authority to direct the detention of a 
person subject to a Questioning Warrant. This power challenges the general 
rule that Australians should only be detained as a result of a finding of 
criminal guilt by a judicial officer. For this reason, the power should not be 
accepted unless there is clear evidence that it is necessary to protect the 
community from terrorism. It is not enough to say that ASIO will exercise 
restraint and only request a Detention Warrant if it believes that the circum-
stances necessitate it. The rule of law requires that legislation tightly constrain 
executive discretion. However, nowhere in the ASIO Act does it require the 
Issuing Authority to be satisfied that issuing a Detention Warrant is necessary 
to protect the community. At the very least, the issuing criteria should be 
amended to include such a requirement. This, together with the existing 
additional detention criterion, should be exposed to the scrutiny of the 
Issuing Authority, rather than left to the judgement of the Attorney-Gen- 
eral alone. 
However, practical considerations suggest that the detention power should 
be repealed rather than merely amended. Since 2002, 16 Questioning War-
rants have been issued. In none of these cases was it regarded as necessary for 
a person to be detained. This suggests that other provisions of the ASIO Act, 
such as the secrecy offences, are sufficient to prevent a person from, for 
example, alerting another person involved in a terrorist act to an ongoing 
investigation. Further, 37 people have been charged with terrorism offences 
since 2003. The fact that no Detention Warrant has been issued in respect of 
any of these people suggests that the detention power is not necessary for 
terrorism investigations or prosecutions. If this is the case, then there is no 
need to renew the detention power again in 2016.  
The statistics also indicate problems with the Questioning Warrants re-
gime. A statistical breakdown of the 16 Questioning Warrants indicates that 
there is no correlation between the issue of such warrants and terrorism 
prosecutions. If Questioning Warrants are not intended to aid prosecutions, 
what function are they intended to serve? The answer to this is, ostensibly, to 
enable ASIO to gather intelligence necessary to protect Australia against the 
threat of terrorism. However, at no point are either the Attorney-General or 
the Issuing Authority asked to consider whether the questioning of an 
individual is actually necessary to achieve this end. We do not argue in this 
article that Questioning Warrants should be repealed, though certainly there 
is a good case that can be put to that effect. At the very least, the criteria for 
issuing a Questioning Warrant should be amended to require that questioning 
a person will substantially assist with the collection of intelligence that is 
reasonably believed capable of preventing a terrorism offence or enabling the 
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prosecution of an offence. This, and the existing criterion that a Questioning 
Warrant may only be issued if other methods of intelligence gathering would 
be inadequate, should also be exposed to the scrutiny of the Issuing Authority. 
The issue of repeat Questioning Warrants also poses a very real problem, 
albeit one that has seldom materialised. In our opinion, the criteria for such a 
warrant should be modified such that they establish a significantly higher 
threshold than for the issue of a Questioning Warrant in the first place. This 
would go some way towards reducing the possibility of ASIO using repeat 
warrants as means of harassment.  
The punitive impact of the coercive questioning regime is exacerbated by 
restrictions on the procedural safeguards provided to a person subject to a 
warrant. First, the ASIO Act empowers a Prescribed Authority to restrict a 
person’s access to a lawyer of his or her choice. Other provisions, such as that 
allowing ASIO to monitor communications between a lawyer and his or her 
client, undermine the efficacy of legal representation and advice. Secondly, 
there is a blanket prohibition on disclosure of information about a warrant — 
including even the fact that a warrant has been issued. The presumption 
underlying these restrictions is that any communications by a person subject 
to a warrant — whether to a lawyer or someone else — are potentially 
dangerous. At times, this means the onus is effectively shifted to the person 
subject to the warrant to prove that communications do not pose a risk to 
national security; at other times, the presumption is not rebuttable.  
There may well be situations in which such restrictions are appropriate. 
However, these are likely to be the exception rather than the norm and the 
restrictions should be narrowed to reflect this. Otherwise, the restrictions are 
disproportionate and unnecessarily hinder access to legal representation and 
advice. There should, for example, be a requirement of exceptional circum-
stances before the right to a lawyer of one’s choice is restricted. The same rule 
should apply to the monitoring of communications between the subject of the 
warrant and his or her lawyer. The secrecy provisions which restrict disclosure 
of information about a warrant should be amended for similar reasons. 
Communications between the subject of a warrant and his or her family, 
friends, employers or medical professionals should only be restricted where 
there is evidence to conclude that disclosure may pose a risk to national 
security. As they stand, these restrictions are disproportionate to the Regime’s 
purposes and mean that the use of the powers is shrouded in an undue degree 
of secrecy. 
The question of whether — and to what extent — individual rights and 
freedoms can be restricted in times of emergency is one of the most challeng-
ing to have faced Western democracies. An even more difficult question faces 
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us today. A decade on from the September 11 terrorist attacks, this state of 
emergency has become the norm; there is no end in sight for the ‘war on 
terror’. Therefore, Australia must start considering and answering the question 
of what its anti-terrorism laws should look like for the long term. Is it pre-
pared to accept the ASIO Special Powers Regime as an ‘ordinary’ part of the 
legal framework? The Regime makes substantial inroads into fundamental 
human rights. Intelligence agencies are given unprecedented powers to detain 
non-suspects. These powers might be acceptable if they were required to 
protect Australia from a terrorist act. However, as this article has demonstrat-
ed, they have rarely been used and the need for them over the longer term has 
not been made out. 
